This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. The evolving nature of conflict will require the U.S. military to conduct humanitarian operations more frequently and on a larger scale than... Read more

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. The evolving nature of conflict will require the U.S. military to conduct humanitarian operations more frequently and on a larger scale than ever before. Humanitarian operations require extensive civil-military interaction, and this study suggests that the U.S. military is not currently postured and prepared to handle the increasing humanitarian requirement.This study analyzes the interactions that took place between the military, the Department of State, and non-governmental organizations throughout three case studies: Operation Unified Assistance (Indonesia, 2004), Operation Unified Response (Haiti, 2010), and Operation United Assistance (West Africa, 2014). Each case study is presented as an independent operation with its own observations and recommendations. The conclusion then identifies four significant generalized items—joint training, militaristic tendencies, integrated communications, and structural systems for collaboration—that challenged civil-military interaction at some point throughout each case. This study concludes that a dedicated unit designed to immediately respond and lead the United States Government's humanitarian effort should be created including manpower and representation from each U.S. agency that plays a part in humanitarian operations. Legislation similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act should pave the way for increased interagency interaction and cooperation to prepare the United States for the increasing demand for humanitarian response capabilities.CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION * A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION * B. LITERATURE REVIEW * 1. Tactical Civil-Military Cooperation * 2. Operational Civil-Military Cooperation * 3. Proposed Solutions * C. POTENTIAL HYPOTHESES * D. RESEARCH DESIGN * E. STUDY OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE * CHAPTER II - OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE * A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE * B. STATE DEPARTMENT AND INTERAGENCY RESPONSE * C. INTERNATIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION RESPONSE * D. OBSERVATIONS * E. THE WAY FORWARD * CHAPTER III - OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE * A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE * B. STATE DEPARTMENT AND INTERAGENCY RESPONSE * C. INTERNATIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION RESPONSE * D. OBSERVATIONS * E. THE WAY FORWARD * CHAPTER IV - OPERATION UNITED ASSISTANCE * A. U.S. MILITARY RESPONSE * B. STATE DEPARTMENT AND INTERAGENCY RESPONSE * C. INTERNATIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION RESPONSE * D. OBSERVATIONS * E. THE WAY FORWARD * CHAPTER V - CONCLUSION * A. RECOMMENDATIONS THEN AND NOW * 1. Joint Training * 2. Militaristic Tendencies * 3. Integrated Communication Networks * 4. Structural Systems for Collaboration * B. THE WAY FORWARD Less